The Downside of Asset Screening for Market Liquidity, Vol. 72, Issue 5, Pages 1937-1982, Journal of Finance, October, 2017
*Previously circulated as Information Acquisition vs. Liquidity in Financial Markets.
This paper explores the tension between asset quality and liquidity in a model where an originator exerts effort to screen assets, whose cash flows can be later sold in secondary markets. Screening improves asset quality, but introduces a problem of asymmetric information that may hinder trade. In the optimal mechanism, costly retention of cash flows is essential to implement positive effort. Market allocations can feature too-much or too-little effort relative to the second best, where over-exertion comes with inefficiently illiquid markets. When gains from trade are large, markets are prone to multiple equilibria. The optimal mechanism is decentralized with differential retention rules and transfers across markets.
Securitization, Ratings, and Credit Supply (with Brendan Daley and Brett Green) - Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Finance
We explore the effect of credit ratings on loan origination and securitization. The model involves two stages: first, banks decide whether to originate a given loan pool or not, and obtain private information about the pools originated. Second, each bank chooses what portion of the pool’s cash flow rights to retain and what portion to securitize. All securities are rated and sold to competitive investors. We characterize how credit ratings affect the trade-off between productive efficiency (i.e., efficiency of the origination process) and allocative efficiency (i.e., efficiency of the securitization process). In particular, we show that credit ratings increase allocative efficiency by reducing costly retention and increase the supply of credit, but reduce average quality of loans originated and can lead to an oversupply of credit relative to first best. These findings are in contrast to regulators view of credit ratings as a disciplining device. We consider extensions of the model to allow for rating shopping and manipulation. Provided investors are fully rational, shopping/manipulation have effects similar to reducing the informativeness of ratings.
This paper studies bank learning through repeated interactions with borrowers from a new perspective. To test for learning by lending, we obtain proxy variables for borrower quality based on their out-of-sample, future credit performance. Such proxy variables are correlated with borrower creditworthiness but unobservable to banks in real time, so they cannot be used directly to price loans. Adapting a methodology from labor economics to control for omitted variables, we show that banks learn about and price on information contained in the proxies as lending relationships mature. We further document heterogeneity in relationship benefits across borrowers, and we investigate whether banks incorporate CEO-specific and business-practice-specific information into loan prices.
Security Design with Ratings (with Brendan Daley and Brett Green)
Investor Experiences and Financial Market Dynamics (with Ulrike Malmendier and Demian Pouzo) - Submitted
How do financial shocks affect investor behavior and market dynamics? Recent evidence suggests that individuals over-weigh personal experiences when forming beliefs and making investment decisions. To study the aggregate implications of such behavior, we propose an OLG model where agents learn from experience. We characterize a novel link between investor demographics and the dependence of prices on past dividends. Different cross-cohort experiences generate persistent heterogeneity in beliefs, portfolio choices, and trade. The model captures many features of asset prices, and produces new implications about the cross-section of asset holdings and market dynamics that are in line with the data.
We construct a dynamic model of financial intermediation in which changes in the information held by financial intermediaries generate asymmetric credit cycles as the ones documented by Reinhart and Reinhart (2010). We model financial intermediaries as “expert” agents who have a unique ability to acquire information about firm fundamentals. While the level of “expertize” in the economy grows in tandem with information that the “experts” possess, the gains from intermediation are hindered by informational asymmetries. We find the optimal financial contracts and show that the economy inherits not only the dynamic nature of information flow, but also the interaction of information with the contractual setting. We introduce a cyclical component to information by supposing that the fundamentals about which experts acquire information are stochastic. While persistence of fundamentals is essential for information to be valuable, their randomness acts as an opposing force and diminishes the value of expert learning. Our setting then features economic fluctuations due to waves of “confidence” in the intermediaries' ability to allocate funds profitably.